Abstract. In this paper we study a 128-bit-key cipher called PC1 which is used as part of the DRM system of the Amazon Kindle e-book reader. This is the first academic cryptanalysis of this cipher and it shows that PC1 is a very weak stream cipher, and can be practically broken in a known-plaintext and even in a ciphertext-only scenario.
Introduction
In this paper we study the stream cipher PC1, a 128-bit key cipher designed by Pukall in 1991. The cipher was first described in a Usenet post [7] and implementations of the cipher can be found on the designer's website [9] 1 . The PC1 cipher is a part of the DRM system of the MOBI e-book format, which is used in the Amazon Kindle and in MobiPocket (a popular free e-book reader which supports a variety of platforms). This fact makes this cipher into one of the most widely deployed ciphers in the world with millions of users holding devices with this algorithm inside. This cipher is also used in a hashing mode by WinHex [10] , an hexadecimal editor used for data recovery and forensics.
So far, no proper security analysis of PC1 is available in the academic literature. Thus it is interesting to study the security of PC1 due to its widespread use and because it offers a nice challenge to cryptanalyst. Our results show practical attacks on the PC1 stream cipher. First, we show a known plaintext attack which recovers the key in a few minutes with a few hundred kilobytes of encrypted text (one small book). Second, we show a ciphertext-only attack, using a secret text encrypted under one thousand different keys. We can recover the plaintext in less than one hour, and we can then use the first attack to extract the keys if needed. Additionally, we show that the hashing mode is extremely weak, by building a simple second-preimage attack with complexity 2 24 , and a more advanced attack using meaningful messages with a similar complexity. Our results are summarized in Table 1. PC1 can be described as a self-synchronizing stream cipher, with a feedback from the plaintext to the internal state. The cipher uses 16-bit integers, and simple arithmetic operations: addition, multiplication and bitwise exclusive or (xor). The round function produces one byte of keystream, and the plaintext is encrypted byte by byte.
The internal state of the cipher can be described as a 16-bit integer s, and an 8-bit integer π which is just the xor-sum of all the previous plaintext bytes
The round function PC1Round takes as input the 128 bit key k and the state (s, π), and will produce one byte of keystream and a new value of the state s.
In this paper we use the following notations:
The value of x after t iterations of PC1Round
A schematic description of PC1 is shown in Figure 1 , and pseudo-code is given in Figure 2 . We can divide the PC1 in two parts, as shown in the figure: -The first part is independent of the state s and takes only the key and the state π as input. We denote this part as KF (key function), and it produces two outputs: w = KF 1 (π, k) is a set of 8 values used by the second part, and σ k = KF 2 (π, k) is used to create the keystream. -The second part updates the state s from the previous value of s, and the value of the w's. We denote this part as SF (state function), and it produces two outputs: SF 1 (s, w) is the new state s, and σ s = SF 2 (s, w) is used to create the keystream.
A high-level representation of PC1 using these functions is given in Figure 3 . An important property of PC1 is that the only operations in KF and SF are modular additions, modular multiplications, and bitwise xors (the f , g i , and h functions only use modular additions and multiplication). Therefore, KF and SF are T-functions [5]: we can compute the i least significant bits of the outputs by knowing only the i least significant bits of the inputs. The only operation that is not a T-function in the PC1 design is the fold from 16 bits to 8 bits at the end. Note that our description of PC1 does not follow exactly available code: we use an equivalent description in order to make the state more explicit. In particular, we put g 0 at the end of the round in order to only have a 16-bit state s, while the reference code keeps two variables and computes g 0 and the subsequent sum at the beginning of the round. We also use an explicit π state instead of modifying the key in place.
